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A PRINCIPLED APPROACH FOR GENERATING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES UNDER
NON-SMOOTH DISSIMILARITY METRICS
ARAM-ALEXANDRE POOLADIAN1, CHRIS FINLAY1, TIM HOHEISEL1, AND ADAM OBERMAN1
ABSTRACT. Deep neural networks perform well on real world data but are prone to adversarial per-
turbations: small changes in the input easily lead to misclassification. In this work, we propose an
attack methodology not only for cases where the perturbations are measured by ℓp norms, but in fact
any adversarial dissimilarity metric with a closed proximal form. This includes, but is not limited
to, ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ∞ perturbations; the ℓ0 counting “norm” (i.e. true sparseness); and the total varia-
tion seminorm, which is a (non-ℓp) convolutional dissimilarity measuring local pixel changes. Our
approach is a natural extension of a recent adversarial attack method, and eliminates the differen-
tiability requirement of the metric. We demonstrate our algorithm, ProxLogBarrier, on the MNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet-1k datasets. We consider undefended and defended models, and show that
our algorithm easily transfers to various datasets. We observe that ProxLogBarrier outperforms a
host of modern adversarial attacks specialized for the ℓ0 case. Moreover, by altering images in the
total variation seminorm, we shed light on a new class of perturbations that exploit neighboring pixel
information.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have strong classification abilities on training and validation
datasets. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial images, which are formally defined as im-
perceptibly small changes (in a given dissimilarity metric) to model input that lead to misclassifi-
cation [33, 16]. This behavior could mean several things: the model is overfitting on some level;
the model is under-regularized; or this is simply due to complex nonlinearities in the model. This
has lead to several lines of work in the deep learning community: the generation of adversarial im-
ages, defending against these adversarial attacks, and lastly determining which dissimilarity metric
to consider.
Regarding the latter, it is not obvious what “imperceptibly small” means, and recent work has
demonstrated adversarial image generation beyond ℓp norms by considering deformations instead
of perturbations [1]. There is also the problem of generating “realistic” attacks, such as through
sparse attacks. For example these include small stickers on a road sign, which may tamper with
autonomous vehicles [13]. The purpose of this work is adversarial image generation for a broad class
of (possibly non-differentiable) dissimilarity metrics for both undefended and defended networks.
We do not make judgment regarding which metric is “best”; instead we are interested in an attack
framework that works well for a broad class of metrics.
Adversarial attacks are often broadly categorized into one of two types: white-box attacks, where
the full structure of the neural network is provided to the attacker, including gradient information,
or black-box attacks, where the attacker is only given the model decision. One of the first proposed
adversarial attacks is the Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM), which generates an adversarial
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image with respect to the ℓ∞ norm, along with its iterative form, dubbed Iterative FGSM (IFGSM)
[16, 19]. A similar iterative attack was also done with respect to the ℓ2 norm. In their purest
form, the above attacks perform gradient ascent on the training loss function subject to a norm
constraint on the perturbation, either with one step in the case of FGSM, or multiple steps in the
case of IFGSM, and their ℓ2 norm equivalents. Apart from training loss maximization, attacks have
been developed using loss functions that directly measure misclassification [8, 24]. Others have
considered the ℓ1 and ℓ0 norms; these both induce sparsity in the perturbations [23]. In the black-
box setting, adversarial examples are generated using only model decisions, which is a much more
expensive endeavor. However, black-box methods often perform better, most notably by avoiding
gradient obfuscation, since they take advantage of sampling properties near the decision boundary
of the model. Notable examples of black-box (decision-based) attacks are the Boundary Attack [7]
and the recent HopSkipJumpAttack [9].
The development of new and improved adversarial attacks has occurred in parallel with various
defensive training regimes to provide robustness against adversarial perturbations. The task of train-
ing a robust network is two-fold: models must be resistant to perturbations of a certain magnitude,
while also maintaining classification ability on clean data. It has been argued that these two objec-
tives are inherently “at odds” [34]. A popular method for training robust networks is adversarial
training, where adversarial examples are added to the training data (see for example [21]).
Contributions. This paper introduces an attack methodology for not just ℓp norms, but any adver-
sarial dissimilarity metric with a closed proximal form. This includes, but is not limited to, ℓ1, ℓ2,
ℓ∞, the ℓ0 counting “norm”, i.e. a true measurement of sparseness of the perturbation, and total
variation, a non-ℓp dissimilarity. Our approach adopts the relaxation structure of the recently pro-
posed LogBarrier attack [15], which required differentiable metrics. We extend this work to include
a broad class of non-smooth (non-differentiable) metrics. Our algorithm, ProxLogBarrier, uses the
proximal gradient method for generating adversarial perturbations. We demonstrate our attack on
MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet-1k datasets. ProxLogBarrier shows significant improvement over
both the LogBarrier attack, and over the other attacks we considered. In particular, in the ℓ0 case, we
achieve state-of-the-art results with respect to a suite of attacks typically used for this problem class.
Finally, by using the total variation dissimiliarity, we shed light on a new class of imperceptible ad-
versaries that incorporates neighboring pixel information, which can be viewed as an adversarial
attack measured in a convolutional norm.
2. BACKGROUND MATERIAL
2.1. Adversarial attacks. Let X be the image space, and ∆c be the label space (the unit-simplex
for c classes). An image-label pair is defined by (x, y) ∈ X × ∆c, with the image belonging
to one of c classes. The trained model is defined by f : X → ∆c. An adversarial perturbation
should be small with respect to a dissimilarity metric (henceforth simply called the metric)m(·;x),
e.g. ‖ · − x‖∞. Formally, the optimal adversarial perturbation is the minimizer of the following
optimization problem:
min
u∈X
m(u;x) subject to argmax f(u) 6= y.(1)
DNNs might be powerful classifiers, but that does not mean their decision boundaries are well-
behaved. Instead, researchers have popularized using the training loss, often the cross-entropy loss,
as a surrogate for the decision boundary: typically a model is trained until the loss is very low, which
is often related to good classification performance. Thus, instead of solving (1), one can perform
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Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on the cross-entropy loss:
(2) max
u∈X
L(u) subject to m(u;x) ≤ ε,
where m(·;x) is typically taken to be either the ℓ2 or ℓ∞ norm, and ε defines the perturbation
threshold of interest.
Some adversarial attack methods try to solve the problem posed in (1) without incorporating
the loss function used to train the network. For example, Carlini & Wagner attack the logit-layer
of a network and solve a different optimization problem, which depends on the choice of norm
[8]. Regarding adversarial defense methods, they demonstrated how a significant number of prior
defense methods fail because of “gradient obfuscation”, where gradients are small only locally to the
image [2]. Another metric of adversarial dissimilarity is the ℓ0 “norm”, which counts the number of
total different pixels between the adversary and the clean image [23, 26]. This is of interest because
an adversary might be required to also budget the number of allowed pixels to perturb, while still
remaining “imperceptible” to the human eye. For example, the sticker-attack [13] is a practical
attack with real-world consequences, and does not interfere with every single part of the image.
2.2. Proximal gradient method. Our adversarial attack amounts to a proximal gradient method.
Proximal algorithms are a driving force for nonsmooth optimization problems, and are receiving
more attention in the deep learning community on a myriad of problems [3, 37, 22, 27]. For a full
discussion on this topic, we suggest [6].
We consider the following framework for proximal algorithms, namely a composite minimization
problem
min
x∈E
Φ(x) := f(x) + g(x)(3)
where E is a Euclidean space. We make the following assumptions:
• g is a non-degenerate, closed convex function over E
• f is non-degenerate, closed function, with dom(f) convex, and has L-Lipschitz gradients
over the interior of its domain
• dom(g) ⊆ int(dom(f))
• the solution set, S, is non-empty.
Generating a stationary point of (3) amounts to finding a fixed point of the following sequence:
x(k+1) = Proxτg(x
(k) − τ∇f(x(k))),(4)
where τ > 0 is some step size, and Proxλg(·) is defined as
Proxλg(x) := argmin
u∈E
g(u) +
1
2λ
‖u− x‖22.
Despite f not being convex, there are still convergence properties we can get from a sequence of
iterates generated in this way. The following theorem is a simplified version of what can be found
in [6] (Section 10.3 with proof), and is the main motivation for our proposed method.
Theorem 1. Given the assumptions on (3), let {xk}k≥0 be the sequence generated by (4), with fixed
step size τ ∈ (L2 ,∞). Then,
(a) the sequence {Φ(xk}k≥0 is non-increasing. In addition, Φ(xk+1) < Φ(xk) if and only if
xk is not a stationary point of (3);
(b) τ
(
xk − Prox 1
τ
(xk − 1
τ
∇f(xk))
)
→ 0 as k →∞;
(c) all limit points of the sequence {xk}k≥0 are stationary points of (3).
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3. OUR METHOD: PROXLOGBARRIER
Following the previous theoretical ideas, we reformulate (1) in the following way:
min
u∈X
m(u;x) s.t. zmax − zy > 0.(5)
Here, Z(·) is the model output before the softmax layer that “projects” onto ∆c, and so zmax :=
maxi 6=y[Z(u)]i and zy := [Z(u)]y . In other words, we want to perturb the clean image minimally
in such a way that the model misclassifies it. This problem is difficult as the decision boundary has
virtually no exploitable structure. Thus the problem can be relaxed using a logarithmic barrier, a
technique often used in traditional optimization [25],
min
u∈X
m(u;x)− λ log(zmax − zy).(6)
This objective function now includes the constraint that enforces misclassification. In [15], (6) was
originally solved via gradient descent, which necessarily assumes that m(·;x) is at least differen-
tiable. The assumption of differentiability is not a given, and may be impracticable. For example,
consider the subgradient of ℓ∞ for an element in Rn;
∂‖ · ‖∞(x) = sign(xk)ek,
where k := argmaxi{|xi|}, and {ei}
n
i=1 are the standard basis vectors. At each subgradient step,
very little information is obtained. Indeed, in the original LogBarrier paper, a smooth approximation
of this norm was used to get around this issue. We shall see that this does not occur with our
proposed ProxLogBarrier method.
For brevity, let ϕ(·) := − log(·) and
F (u) :=
(
max
i 6=y
Z(u)
)
− [Z(u)]y.
The optimization problem (6) becomes
min
u∈X
m(u;x) + λϕ(F (u)).(7)
One can draw several similarities between (7) and (3). As before, we have no guarantees of con-
vexity on ϕ ◦ F , which is a representation of f in the composite problem, but it is smooth provided
F (·) ∈ dom(ϕ) (that is, F is smooth from a computational perspective). Our dissimilarity metric
m(u;x) represents g, as it usually has a closed-form proximal operator. Thus, we simply turn to the
proximal gradient method to solve the minimization problem in (7).
We iteratively find a minimizer for the problem; the attack is outlined in Algorithm 1. Due to the
highly non-convex nature of the decision boundary, we perform a backtracking step to ensure the
proposed iterate is in fact adversarial. We remark that the adversarial attack problem is constrained
by the image-space, and thus requires a further projection step back onto the image space (pixels
must be in the range [0,1]). In traditional non-convex optimization, best practice is to also record the
“best iterate”, as valleys are likely pervasive throughout the decision boundary. This way, even at
some point our gradient sends our image far-off and is unable to return in the remaining iterations,
we already have a better candidate. The algorithm begins with a misclassified image, and moves
the iterates towards the original image by minimizing the dissimilarity metric. Misclassification
is maintained by the log barrier function, which prevents the iterates from crossing the decision
boundary. Refer to Figure 1. Contrast this with PGD based algorithms, which begin at or near the
original image, and iterate away from the original image.
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Algorithm 1 ProxLogBarrier (PLB)
Input: image-label pair (x, y), trained model f , adversarial dissimilarity metricm(·;x)
Intialize hyperparameters: Kinner,K ∈ N, and µ, h, λ0 > 0, β ∈ (0, 1).
Initialize u(0) to be misclassified, w(0) := u(0)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
EveryKinner iterations: λ = λ0β
k
y(k) = Proxµm
(
u(k) − hλ∇ϕ(F (u(k)))
)
u(k+1) = Project(y(k);X )
Backtrack along line between current and previous iterate until misclassified
if m(u(k+1);x) < m(w(k);x) then
w(k+1) = u(k+1)
else
w(k+1) = w(k)
end if
end for
Output: w(K)
Original image
Initial iterate
Decis
ion b
ound
ary
FIGURE 1. Illustration of the ProxLogBarrier attack: the attack is initialized with
a misclassified image, which is then moved towards the original image.
Proximal operators for ℓp dissimilarities. To complete the algorithm, it remains to compute the
proximal operator Proxµm(·) for various choices ofm. One can turn to [6] for complete derivations
of the proximal operators for the adversarial metrics we are considering, namely ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ∞ norms,
and the ℓ0 cardinality function. Consider measuring the ℓ∞ distance between the clean image and
our desired adversarial perturbation:
m(u;x) := ‖u− x‖∞.
Due to the Moreau Decomposition Theorem [29], the proximal operator of this function relies on
projecting onto the unit ℓ1 ball:
Proxµ‖· − x‖∞(z) = x+ Proxµ‖·‖∞(z − x)
= x+ (z − x)− µProxB1((z − x)/µ)
= z − µProj‖·‖1((z − x)/µ).
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We make use of the algorithm from [12] to perform the projection step, implemented over batches
of vectors for efficiency. Similarly, one obtains the proximal operator for ℓ1 and ℓ2 via the same
theorem,
Proxµ‖· − x‖1(z) = x+ Tµ(z − x),
Proxµ‖· − x‖2(z) = z − µProj‖·‖2((z − x)/µ),
where Tµ(s) := sign(s)max{|s|−µ, 0} is the soft thresholding operator. In the case that one wants
to minimize the number of perturbed pixels in the adversarial image, one can turn to the counting
“norm”, called ℓ0, which counts the number of non-zero entries in a vector. While this function is
non-convex, the proximal operator still has a closed form:
Pµ‖· − x‖0(z) = x+H√2µ(z − x)
where Hα(s) = s1{|s|>α}(s) is a hard-thresholding operator, and acts component-wise in the case
of vector arguments.
Example of non-ℓp dissimilarity: Total variation. We let X denote the image space, and for the
time being assume the images are grayscale, and letM denote the finite-difference operator on the
grid-space defined by the image. ThenM : X → X ×X , where
(Mv)i,j =
(
Dxv
Dyv
)
i,j
:=
(
vi+1,j − vi,j
vi,j+1 − vi,j
)
i,j
,(8)
where (i, j) are the pixel indices of the image in row-column notation. The anisotropic total varia-
tion semi-norm is defined by
‖v‖TV := ‖Mv‖1,1 =
∑
i,j
|(Dxv)i,j |+ |(Dyv)i,j |,(9)
where ‖ · ‖1,1 is an induced matrix norm. Heuristically, this is a measure of large changes between
neighboring pixels. In practice Mv can be implemented via a convolution. In the case of color
images, we aggregate the total variation for each channel. Total variation (TV) is not true norm,
in that non-zero images v can have zero TV. In what follows, we omit the distinction and write
TV-norm to mean the total variation seminorm. Traditionally, TV has been used in the context of
image denoising [30].
What does this mean in the context of adversarial perturbations? The TV-norm of the perturbation
will be small when the perturbation has few jumps between pixels. That is, small TV-norm pertur-
bations have locally flat regions. This is primarily because TV-norm is convolutional in nature: the
finite-difference gradient operator incorporates neighboring pixel information. We note that this is
not the first instance of TV being used as a disimillarity metric [35]; however our approach is quite
different and is not derived from a flow. An outline for the proximal operator can be found in [6];
we use a standard package for efficient computation [4, 5]
4. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
Outline. We compare the ProxLogBarrier attack with several other adversarial attacks on MNIST
[20], CIFAR10 [18], and ImageNet-1k [11]. For MNIST, we use the network described in [26];
on CIFAR10, we use a ResNeXt network [36]; and for ImageNet-1k, ResNet50 [17, 10]. We also
consider defended models for the aforementioned networks. This is to further benchmark the attack
capability of the ProxLogBarrier, and to reaffirm previous work in the area. For defended models,
we consider Madry-style adversarial training for CIFAR10 and MNIST [21]. On ImageNet-1k, we
use the recently proposed scaleable input gradient regularization for adversarial robustness [14].
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We randomly select 1000 (test) images to evaluate performance on MNIST and CIFAR10, and 500
(test) images on ImageNet-1k. We consider the same images on their defended counterparts. We
note that for ImageNet-1k, we consider the problem of Top5 misclassification, where the log barrier
is with respect to the following constraint set
Z[u](5) − Z[u](y) > 0
where (i) denotes the ith largest index.
We compare the ProxLogBarrier attack with a wide range of attack algorithms that are available
through the FoolBox adversarial attack library [28]. For perturbations in ℓ0, we compare against
SparseFool [23], Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [26], and Pointwise [31] (this latter attack
is black-box). For ℓ2 attacks, we consider Carlini-Wagner’s attack (CW) [8], Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [19], DeepFool [24], and the original LogBarrier attack [15]. Finally, for ℓ∞ norm
perturbations, we consider PGD, DeepFool, and LogBarrier. All hyperparameters are left to their
implementation defaults, with the exception of SparseFool, where we used the exact parameters
indicated in the paper. We omit the One-Pixel attack [32], as [23] showed that this attack is quite
weak on MNIST, CIFAR10, and not tractable on ImageNet-1k.
Implementation details for our algorithm. When optimizing for ℓ2 based noise, we initialize the
adversarial image with sufficiently large Gaussian noise; for ℓ∞ and ℓ0 based perturbations, we
use uniform noise. For hyper-parameters, we used λ0 = 0.1, β = 0.75, h = 0.1, µ = 1, with
K = 900,Kinner = 30. We observed some computational drawbacks for ImageNet-1k: firstly,
the proximal operator for the ℓ0 norm is far too strict. We decided to use the ℓ1 norm to induce
sparseness in our adversarial perturbation (changing both the prox parameter and the step size to
0.5). Other parameter changes for the ImageNet-1k dataset are that for the proximal parameter in
the ℓ∞ case, we set µ = 3, and we used 2500 algorithm iterations. Finally, we found that using the
softmax layer outputs helps with ImageNet-1k attacks against both the defended and undefended
network. For TV-norm, perturbations, we set the proximal parameter µ = 5, and K = 200 with
Kinner = 20 (far less than before).
1We believe this is an implementation error on behalf of the repository. To accurately compare, we attacked an
18-layer ResNet for CIFAR10 that achieves slightly worse clean error as reported in [23]. Our median percent pixels
perturbed was 1.4%, and they reported 1.27%.
TABLE 1. Adversarial robustness statistics, measured in the ℓ0 norm.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distanceε = 10 ε = 30 ε = 30 ε = 80 ε = 500 ε = 1000
PLB 86.30 100 6 44.10 68.50 39 66.00 80.20 268
SparseFool 46.00 99.40 11 15.60 22.60 30711 30.40 46.80 1175∗
JSMA 12.73 61.38 25 29.56 48.92 84 — — —
Pointwise 5.00 57.30 28 13.20 50.60 80 — — —
(D) PLB 79.8 98.90 6 74.90 97.80 13 38.40 70.0 691
(D) SparseFool 20.67 75.45 20 34.23 52.15 70 24.80 41.80 1310∗
(D) JSMA 12.63 44.51 34 36.65 60.79 53 — — —
(D) Pointwise 12.50 65.80 24 23.80 43.10 102 — — —
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TABLE 2. Adversarial robustness statistics, measured in the ℓ∞ norm.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distance
ε = 0.1 ε = 0.3 ε = 2255 ε =
8
255 ε =
2
255 ε =
8
255
PLB 10.30 100 1.67e−1 95.00 98.60 2.88e−3 20.40 33.80 6.66e−2
PGD 10.70 80.90 1.76e−1 54.70 87.00 5.91e−3 90.80 98.60 2.5e−3
DeepFool 8.12 86.55 2.25e−1 16.23 51.00 3.04e−2 93.64 100 2.8e−3
LogBarrier 5.89 73.90 2.43e−1 60.60 93.10 6.84e−3 7.60 7.70 6.16e−1
(D) PLB 3.0 32.9 3.24e−1 23.3 44.1 3.64e−2 11.40 18.80 1.06e−1
(D) PGD 2.8 23.6 3.37e−1 22.9 46.1 3.45e−2 49.20 96.60 7.94e−3
(D) DeepFool 2.7 10.2 6.66e−1 23.8 44.1 3.74e−2 43.20 97.40 9.31e−3
(D) LogBarrier 2.50 11.89 5.48e−1 17.6 28.3 8.01e−2 9.80 10.40 4.43e−1
Reporting. For perturbations in ℓ2 and ℓ∞, we report the percent misclassification at various thresh-
old levels that are somewhat standard [34]. Our choices for ℓ0 distance thresholds were arbitrary,
however we supplement with a median perturbation distances on all attack norms to mitigate cherry-
picking. For attacks that were unable to successfully perturb at least half the sampled images, we do
not report anything. If the attack was able to perturb more than half but not all, we add an asterisk
to the median distance. We denote the defended models by “(D)” (recall that for MNIST and CI-
FAR10, we are using Madry’s adversarial training, and scaleable input-gradient regularization for
Imagenet-1k).
Perturbations in ℓ0. Result for ℓ0 perturbations are found in Table 1, with examples available in
Figure 2 and Figure 4b. Across all datasets considered, ProxLogBarrier outperforms all other attack
methods, for both defended and undefended networks. It also appears immune to Madry-style
adversarial training on both MNIST and CIFAR10. This is entirely reasonable, for the Madry-
style adversarial training is targeted towards ℓ∞ attacks. In contrast, on ImageNet-1k, the defended
model trained with input-gradient regularization performs significantly better than the undefended
model, even though this defence is not aimed towards ℓ0 attacks. Neither JSMA or Pointwise scale
to networks on ImageNet-1k. Pointwise exceeds at smaller images, since it takes less than 1000
TABLE 3. Adversarial robustness statistics, measured in the ℓ2 norm.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distance
% error at median
distance
ε = 1.25 ε = 2.3 ε = 80255 ε =
120
255 ε = 0.5 ε = 1
PLB 38.60 99.40 1.35 97.70 99.80 1.15e−1 47.60 89.40 5.24e−1
CW 35.10 98.30 1.41 89.94 95.97 1.32e−1 20.06 44.26 1.16
PGD 24.70 70.00 1.70 60.60 73.30 2.10e−1 37.60 70.60 6.72e−1
DeepFool 13.21 48.04 2.35 17.33 22.04 1.11 40.08 76.48 6.23e−1
LogBarrier 37.40 98.90 1.35 69.60 84.00 2.02e−1 43.70 88.30 5.68e−1
(D) PLB 29.50 92.90 1.54 28.7 35.4 7.26e−1 15.80 28.20 1.74
(D) CW 28.24 78.59 1.72 29.6 38.7 6.60e−1 — — —
(D) PGD 17.20 45.70 2.44 28.30 34.70 7.97e−1 14.60 22.60 2.20
(D) DeepFool 5.22 18.07 3.73 28.0 33.3 9.31e−1 15.60 24.40 2.14
(D) LogBarrier 25.00 89.60 1.65 28.0 34.6 7.36e−1 10.00 10.20 63.17
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(A) ℓ0 attacks on MNIST (B) ℓ0 attacks on CIFAR10
FIGURE 2. Adversarial images for ℓ0 perturbations, generated by our method.
(A) TV-norm
attacks on
MNIST
(B) TV-norm
attacks on
CIFAR10
FIGURE 3. Adversarial images for TV-norm perturbations, generated by our method.
iterations to cycle over every pixel and check if it can be zero’d out. We remark that SparseFool was
unable to adversarially attack all images, whereas ProxLogBarrier always succeeded.
Perturbations in ℓ∞. Results for ℓ∞ perturbations are found in Table 2. Our attack stands out on
MNIST, in both the defended and undefended case. On CIFAR10, our attack is best on the unde-
fended network, and only slightly worse than PGD when adversarially defended. On ImageNet-1k,
our method suffers dramatically. This is likely due to very poor decision boundaries with respect
to this norm ℓ∞, as our method will necessarily be better when the boundaries are not muddled.
PGD does not focus on the decision boundaries explicitly, thus has more room to find something
adversarial quickly.
Perturbations in ℓ2. Results for perturbations measured in Euclidean distance are found in Table
3. For MNIST and ImageNet-1k, on both defended and undefended networks, our attack performs
better than all other methods, both in median distance and at a given perturbation norm threshold.
On CIFAR10, we are best on undefended but lose to CW in the defended case. However, the CW
attack did not scale to ImageNet-1k using the implementation in the FoolBox attack library.
Perturbations in the TV-norm. To our knowledge, there are no other TV-norm atacks against which
to compare our methods. However, we present the median total variation across the data in question,
and a handful of pictures for illustration. OnMNIST, adversarial images with minimal total variation
are often as expected: near-flat perturbations or very few pixels perturbed (see Figure 3a). For
CIFAR10 and ImageNet-1k, we have found that adversarial images with small TV-norm have an
adversarial “tint” on the image: they appear nearly identical to the original, with a small color shift.
When the adversary is not a tint, perturbations are highly localized or localized in several regions.
See for example Figures 3b and 4a.
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TABLE 4. Statistics for perturbations in TV-norm
median TV-norm max TV-norm
MNIST 2.52 11.0
CIFAR10 1.36 11.0
ImageNet-1k 13.4 149.6
TABLE 5. ProxLogBarrier attack runtimes (in seconds)
Batch Size ℓ0 ℓ2 ℓ∞
MNIST 100 8.35 6.91 6.05
CIFAR10 25 69.07 56.11 30.87
ImageNet-1k 1 35.45 29.47 75.50
Algorithm runtime. We strove to implement ProxLogBarrier so that it could be run in a reasonable
amount of time. For that reason, ProxLogBarrier was implemented to work over a batch of images.
Using one consumer grade GPU, we can comfortably attack several MNIST and CIFAR10 images
simultaneously, but only one ImageNet-1k image at a given time. We report our algorithm runtimes
in Table 5. Algorithms implemented from the FoolBox repository were not written to take advan-
tage of the GPU, hence we omit run-time comparisons. Heuristically speaking, PGD is one of the
faster algorithms, whereas CW, SparseFool, and DeepFool are slower. We omit the computational
complexity for minimizing total variation since the proximal operator is coded in C, and not Python.
We are not surprised that our attack in ℓ0 takes longer than the other norms; this is likely due to the
backtracking step to ensure misclassification of the iterate. On ImageNet-1k, the ProxLogBarrier
attack in the ℓ∞ metric is quite slow due to the projection step onto the ℓ1 ball, which isO(n log(n)),
where n is the input dimension size [12].
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented a concise framework for generating adversarial perturbations by incorporating
the proximal gradient method. We have expanded upon the LogBarrier attack, which was originally
only effective in ℓ2 and ℓ∞ norms, by addressing the ℓ0 norm case and the total variation seminorm.
Thus we have proposed a method unifying all three common perturbation scenarios. Our approach
requires fewer hyperparameter tweaks than LogBarrier, and performs significantly better than many
attack methods we compared against, both on defended and undefended models, and across all
norm choices. We highlight that our method is, to our knowledge, the best choice for perturbations
measured in ℓ0, compared to all other methods available in FoolBox. We also perform better than
all other attacks considered on the MNIST network with in the median distance and in commonly
reported thresholds. The proximal gradient method points towards new forms of adversarial attacks,
such as those measured in the TV-norm, provided the attack’s dissimilarity metric has a closed
proximal form.
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